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PRESS ACCESS TO AMERICAN MILITARY




"This stinks! Newsweek just printed our entire battle plan."
-General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Ret. (1991)1
I. INTRODUCrION
General Schwarzkopf's comments indicate that an unfettered
right of the press to gather information from a battlefield and globally
disseminate it within seconds can harm American fighting forces.
However, the First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom.., of the press."2 The
question thus arises: can the government restrict the freedom of the
press to cover military operations? This comment answers this ques-
tion affirmatively, demonstrating that operational security and troop
safety justify restrictions on the press' right to access military opera-
tions and publish information obtained from those operations.
II. GENERAL AREAS OF DISCUSSION
First, this comment describes the history of press access to mili-
tary operations from the Revolutionary War to the present.3 This brief
discussion focuses on the Sidle Panel convened in 1984 to arrive at
1. GENERAL H. NoRmAN SCHWARZKOPF, RET., IT DOESN'T TAKE A HERO 440 (1992).
Prior to the start of the ground war between the Allies and Iraq on February 23, 1991, a CNN
pool reporter inadvertently revealed, on live television, the identity of American forces involved
in an artillery duel with Iraqi forces. Id. at 459. Schwarzkopf commented that "any halfway
competent Iraqi intelligence officer watching CNN... would then discover that the 82nd [Air-
borne] was positioned for a flanking attack, a fact... [CENTCOM] had taken great pains to
conceal." Id. at 440. Schwarzkopf also postulated that this enabled Newsweek to publish a map
which "almost exactly depict[ed]" the 82nd flanking plan. Id.
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
3. See discussion infra section III.
1
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"workable solutions for media-military relations in future military op-
erations."4 Second, this comment analyzes the First Amendment doc-
trines of prior restraint and right of access in the context of past and
current access restrictions imposed by the military on the press.' This
discussion demonstrates that these restrictions are constitutional. This
comment concludes by recommending that the Pentagon continue to
follow its current policy of pool system reporting and security review
in future military operations.6
III. THe HISTORY OF PRESS COVERAGE OF AMERICAN MILITARY
OPERATIONS
A. Pre-Sidle Panel Conflicts: The Revolutionary War Through
Grenada
Press coverage during the Revolutionary War depended "wholly
on the chance arrival of private letters and of official and semi-official
messages."7 Soldiers doubling as correspondents provided many of
the stories for the newspapers.8 Although censorship laws existed at
the time, the government did not censor press reports during the war.9
Press coverage in the War of 1812 was "almost as haphazard as
that of the Revolutionary War," however, news reporters were able to
report particular events of the war due to their close proximity to the
conflict. 10 There is no available evidence from this war which indi-
cates that the press had special access to military operations."
The Mexican-American War "marked the beginning of modem
war correspondence.' 2 The newspapers still relied significantly on
4. REPORT BY CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS PANEL
(Aug. 23, 1984)[hereinafter Smr PANEL REPORT] (quoting letter from retired Major General
W'mant Sidle to General John W. Vessey, Jr. (undated) (accompanying SmLE PANEL REPoRT));
see also discussion infra section III.B.
5. See discussion infra section IV.
6. See discussion infra section V. A pool is a group of media personnel, credentialed by
the military and provided with an escort officer, assembled for the purpose of providing press
coverage of military operations. See infra notes 55, 69.
7. FRANK LLTHER Mort, AmEicAN JOUpNALISM, A I-IsTORY: 1690-1960 99 (3d ed.
1962).
8. Paul G. Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right of
Access, Grenada, and "Off-the-Record Wars," 73 GEO. L.J. 931, 933 (1985).
9. Id.
10. Mo-r, supra note 7, at 196. When the British captured and burned the nation's capital,
correspondents were present. Cassell, supra note 8, at 933.
11. Cassell, supra note 8, at 934.
12. Mort, supra note 7, at 249.
[Vol. 31:227
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private correspondence, however, press coverage of this war was ex-
tensive. 13 Furthermore, the military did not place restrictions on cor-
respondents during the war.' 4
During the Civil War, the military frequently but inconsistently
imposed press restrictions and censorship. 5 In the North, Lincoln's
administration imposed restrictions and censorship on the press in or-
der to ensure military success.' 6 Moreover, "the lack of any standard-
ized rules controlling the press, coupled with the inconsistent
enforcdment of published regulations, resulted in hostility and mis-
trust between some Union commanders and wartime journalists."' 7
In the Confederacy, the military frequently excluded correspondents
from the lines.'8 The exclusion was due, in part, to the small size of
the Southern press corps.19 However, despite the aforementioned ex-
ceptions, the press published almost any story it pleased. 0
Press restrictions during the Spanish-American War in 1898 virtu-
ally did not exist; the military granted journalists a remarkable degree
of journalistic freedom." "Newspapers printed anything their editors
desired, including military plans and movements. 22 The military
13. Cassell, supra note 8, at 934.
14. JOSEPH J. MATHEws, REPORTINr THE VARs 54 (1957). General Zachary Taylor per-
mitted reporters to ride into battle with his troops. M.L. SrEIN, UNDER FIRE: THE STORY OF
AmERicAN WAR CORRIEsPONDEN1s 13-14 (1968).
15. Mor, supra note 7, at 336.
16. Karl T. Olson, Note, The Constitutionality of Department of Defense Press Restrictions
on Wartime Correspondents Covering the Persian Gulf War, 41 DRAKE L. REv. 511, 514 (1992).
Due to the size and geography of the war, "[m]ajor battles were fought without the presence of
authorized newspaper reporters." MAInnws, supra note 14, at 80.
17. Olson, supra note 16, at 514. Some commanders excluded the press completely. In
1861, General William T. Sherman expelled every newspaper correspondent from the lines be-
cause he found that his operations in Kentucky had been exposed by reports of his movements in
the press. Cassell, supra note 8, at 935. Similarly, General Henry Halleck "expelled all newspa-
per men from his army in May, 1862." Mor, supra note 7, at 338.
18. Cassell, supra note 8, at 935.
19. Id. "For a great battle or campaign to occur without the presence of representatives of
the Northern newspapers was exceptional; for the Southern press to be inadequately represented
was commonplace, and on a number of occasions it had no civilian [reporters] on the scene."
MATHEWS, supra note 14, at 95.
The military also denied correspondents access to telegraph lines. Mo-r, supra note 7, at
338. In February 1862, President Lincoln, acting with congressional authorization, ordered all
telegraph lines to be placed under military supervision. MAr-nws, supra note 14, at 82. This
action limited the ability of correspondents to send stories without submitting to censorship, and
also forced several correspondents to personally deliver stories "from the battlefields to their
newspapers-some stories being three to four days old by the time they reached press." Olson,
supra note 16, at 515.
20. Cassell, supra note 8, at 936.
21. Olson, supra note 16, at 515.
22. Id. "Most correspondents ... ignored their proper status as noncombatants and actively
fought against the Spanish, some actually performing espionage." Id.
3
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made efforts to control the press, but for the most part, the military
gave extreme deference to correspondents.23
During the more than twenty expeditions conducted by the
United States military into the Caribbean and Central America be-
tween 1880 and 1924, the military permitted the press to go ashore
with the troops.2 4 In World War I, correspondents accompanied the
first American troops when they arrived in St. Nazaire, France in
1917.25 Upon arrival, the American press was strictly controlled and
heavily censored by measures which France and Great Britain insti-
tuted; however, the restrictions for the American press gradually
abated.26 Stories from American correspondents were still scrutinized
and censored by the Military Intelligence Service at press
headquarters.27
After America entered World War II on December 7, 1941, the
government immediately imposed censorship.2 8 Following the Japa-
nese attack on Pearl Harbor, "the government created an elaborate
censorship apparatus. '29 The Office of Censorship, created as part of
that apparatus, issued a Code of Wartime Practice to press organiza-
tions.3" "Correspondents were not allowed in the theaters of war un-
less they were accredited, and one of the conditions of accreditation
was that the correspondent must sign an agreement to submit all his
copy to military or naval censorship. '31 The press generally recog-
nized and accepted the need for censorship, yet some reporters fre-
quently criticized military censors for purportedly withholding
23. Id.
24. Cassell, supra note 8, at 936. The U.S. Army did not implement press censorship during
its expedition against the Mexican bandit-revolutionary Pancho Villa in 1916. Id. at 937 n.37.
However, there were some instances of press exclusion. "John J. Pershing excluded the press
from the Mindoro Island pacification operation in the Philippines and fought a successful cam-
paign without any media scrutiny." Id. at 936-37.
25. JOHN HOHENBERG, FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE: TE GREAT REPORTERS AND THEIR
TMims 236 (1964).
26. Kevin P. Kenealey, Comment, The Persian Gulf War and the Press: Is There a Constitu-
tional Right of Access to Military Operations? 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 287,314 (1992). "Once accred-
ited, correspondents might go and come as they pleased; writers with other armies were
commonly compelled to go about with military escorts, but American correspondents could visit
front-line trenches alone if they pleased, or even 'go over the top"' and accompany the troops
into battle. Morr, supra note 7, at 621.
27. Morr, supra note 7, at 621.
28. Cassell, supra note 8, at 937-38.
29. Id. at 938.
30. Id.
31. PHILLiP KNIGHTILEY, THE FIRsT CASUALTY, FROM CRIMEA TO VIETNAM: THE WAR
CoRRESPONDENT AS HERO, PROPAGANDIST, AND MYTH MAKER 275 (1975).
[Vol. 31:227
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information unnecessarily.32 Even so, the press capitulated to heavy
censorship in exchange for wide access to the frontlines.33 The Ameri-
can press, however, was not present at every military engagement be-
cause there simply were not enough reporters to cover every action. 4
Most of the war's major actions were reported from headquarters far
to the rear of the battlefront. Only a handful of reporters landed
with troops on the shores of Normandy during the D-day landings of
June 6, 1944.36
The press restrictions in place during the Korean War were basi-
cally the same as those in place during World War II.37 General
32. Morr, supra note 7, at 763. General Douglas MacArthur established the strictest cen-
sorship of any theater of operations. KNIGHIEY, supra note 31, at 281-82. He ordered that
"any correspondent who interviewed any member of the Allied forces would be banned from
advanced bases and that the soldier would be court-martialed." Id. at 281. MacArthur also
ordered that all press reports had to pass through his headquarters for review regardless of
whether they had already been cleared by another censor in the Pacific theater of operations. Id.
"In some cases, heavy censorship distorted the news." Cassell, supra note 8, at 938. In the
Pacific, the Navy only conceded the loss of one battleship at Pearl Harbor when in fact the
Japanese sunk five and damaged three. KNIGHTI.EY, supra note 31, at 273. News of naval losses
at the Battle of Savo in the Solomon Islands, and the sinking of the aircraft carriers Lexington,
Yorktown, and Wasp was held up for weeks. Moi-r, supra note 7, at 763. The Navy withheld the
bad news in order to deny the Japanese knowledge of the losses they had actually inflicted. Id. at
763-64. Military censors attempted to conceal other stories such as the American victory at Mid-
way, for fear that the Japanese might figure out that the Americans broke their code. Cassell,
supra note 8, at 938.
"In the European theater, all publications had to be cleared as well, [but the] censorship was
less rigorous." Cassell, supra note 8, at 939. Nonetheless, some stories could not be repeated
such as the General Patton soldier-slapping incident in Italy and the loss of twenty transport
planes and over 400 American soldiers to American guns at Bari. MATHEws, supra note 14, at
215. Also, a news blackout was initially imposed during the Battle of the Bulge. Id. at 215-16.
33. Cassell, supra note 8, at 939. "American correspondents accompanied the assault
troops in the first stage of the battle on numerous occasions, including 'along the fronts in Tuni-
sia, Sicily, Italy, and northwest Europe, [where] reporters had complete freedom of movement."'
Kenealey, supra note 26, at 214. On many occasions "[c]orrespondents flew on bombing mis-
sions, rode destroyers, went on patrols, were strafed and shelled and frequently became the
targets for snipers." M.L. ST-rN, UNDER FIR: Tim STORY OF AMERICAN WAR CORRESPON-
DENTS 95 (1968).
34. Cassell, supra note 8, at 939.
35. Id. at 939-40.
36. Id. at 940.
37. Kenealey, supra note 26, at 315.
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Douglas A. MacArthur, the U.N. commander in Korea, made report-
ing the war difficult.3 8 After MacArthur's dismissal, the military re-
laxed censorship and the American press was no longer restricted
from the front lines.3 9
In terms of complete and open access given to the press, no other
war can match that of the conflict in Vietnam.4" Even today, many
still believe that the American public turned against the war due to
biased reporting. 41 At the beginning of American involvement in
Vietnam, the military treated the press well.42 Later, even as distrust
grew between the military and the press, the military still provided
reporters with access to combat operations.43 Military censorship of
news reports was nonexistent in Vietnam as reporters merely signed
an agreement to abide by a set of simple ground rules that dealt pri-
marily with the preservation of military security. 4 The official mili-
tary policy in Vietnam was to provide wide press coverage which was
flexible and informally censored.45
The American invasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983, "marks
a historical break in press coverage. ' 46 The Pentagon did not permit
38. Cassell, supra note 8, at 940. The press was "at the mercy of the army for communica-
tions, transportation, and housing" which, the army told reporters, was "urgently needed else-
where." KNIGHTLEY, supra note 31, at 338. MacArthur's press chief, Colonel Pat Echols,
"regarded the press as natural enemies." Id.
In a strange twist, the Korean War correspondents requested that the military impose full,
compulsory censorship. Cassell, supra note 8, at 940. The media saw this censorship as a trade-
off for greater access. Kenealey, supra note 26, at 315. In January, 1951, MacArthur's headquar-
ters imposed full censorship placing correspondents under complete jurisdiction of the army and
mandating that for any violation of a long list of regulations a reporter could be punished by
measures ranging from suspension to court-martial. KNIHTrLEY, supra note 31, at 345-46.
39. Cassell, supra note 8, at 941.
40. Kenealey, supra note 26, at 315.
41. Cassell, supra note 8, at 941; see also GENERAL WiLLIAM C. WESTMoRLAND, A SoL-
DiER REPORTS 420-21 (1976). In praising Drew Middleton, a reporter for the New York Tines,
for his unbiased reporting of the events in South Vietnam, General Westmoreland also criticized
other reporters who attempted to "influence the course of events" there. Id. at 66. General
Westmoreland believed that these new "folk heroes" sought recognition and reward through
criticism of and negativism toward American policy in South Vietnam. Id.
42. Cassell, supra note 8, at 941. The military provided transport for correspondents to fly
to Vietnam for short tours to "get a first-hand acquaintance with the facts." KNorrrLEY, supra
note 31, at 382.
43. Cassell, supra note 8, at 941. Prior to the Tet Offensive in December 1968, relatively
few reporters saw any combat despite the ease of access to the battlefield. Id. at 941-42.
44. KNIcHIE, supra note 31, at 403. "These voluntarily enforced ground rdles were suc-
cessful in preventing security violations." Kenealey, supra note 26, at 316.
45. Kenealey, supra note 26, at 316.
46. Id. American forces were used sparingly during the time period between Vietnam and
Grenada. No correspondents accompanied the failed raid to rescue American hostages in Iran
in 1980. Cassell, supra note 8, at 943. The military permitted correspondents to accompany
American peacekeeping forces in Lebanon and American advisors in El Salvador with only a
few restrictions. Id.
6
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correspondents to join in the invasion force, because their presence
would jeopardize security and "complicate the force's logistical
problems."'47 On the day following the invasion, U.S. warships pre-
vented journalists from gaining access to Grenada by private boats. 48
A pool of fifteen journalists were permitted onto the island dur-
ing the third day of the operation.49 Although the military provided
escorts for these journalists, they "were allowed to remain on the is-
land for only a few hours."50 The military refused to grant un-
restricted access to Grenada until six days after the initial invasion,
but by then, the operation was nearly complete.5 '
Press organizations criticized the Pentagon for denying media ac-
cess to the Grenada operation. 2 The criticism led to allegations that
"Reagan Administration officials and military authorities dissemi-
nated much inaccurate information and many unproven assertions...
[and] did so while withholding significant facts and impeding efforts
by journalists to verify official statements."53 Conversely, the Ameri-
can public supported the Reagan administration's decision to restrict
press coverage of the invasion.54
B. The Sidle Panel
After the operation in Grenada, the Chairman of the Joint Chidfs
of Staff convened a panel of former war correspondents and esteemed
journalists to make recommendations regarding the management of
47. Cassell, supra note 8, at 943.
48. Olson, supra note 16, at 520. The only independent news reports of the initial stages of
the invasion came from two ham radio operators who lived on Grenada, Cassell, supra note 8 at
943, and "from reports by Radio Havana." Olson, supra note 16, at 520.
49. Olson, supra note 16, at 520.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Cassell, supra note 8, at 944.
53. Id. at 945.
54. Id. "Letters to NBC ran ten-to-one against admitting the press," forcing the press to do
"a great deal of soul searching." Id. Unexpected support for the exclusion came from columnist
George Will:
Many journalists advocate an 'adversary' stance toward their government, denying any
duty to weigh the consequences of what they print or broadcast. But incantation of the
words 'the public's right to know' is no substitute for thinking. Someone must makejudgements. Many journalists assert a moral as well as constitutional right to the stat-
ute of-strictly speaking-irresponsibility.
JoN N. MooRE Er A., NATIONAL SEcumRT LAW 994 (1990).
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military-media relations during military operations.55 The panel pref-
aced its recommendations with three points. 56 First, the panel unani-
mously agreed that "the U.S. media should cover U.S. military
operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission
security and the safety of U.S. forces."57 Second, the panel declined
to assess military-media procedures in place during the Grenada oper-
ation, since the Joint Chiefs did not request that they do so.58 Third,
the panel recognized that the media has the responsibility to make
possible the comprehensive, intelligent, and objective reporting of
military operations.5 9
Initially, the media was pleased with the military's level of coop-
eration "in accepting the panel's recommendations. ' 60 However, the
media quickly became skeptical of the Pentagon's new policy when,
soon thereafter, the Pentagon imposed absolute control regarding the
55. SmL PANEL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1. Retired Major General Winant Sidle, a for-
mer military spokesman in Vietnam, headed the panel. Cassell, supra note 8, at 945. The group
was comprised of retired media personnel and representatives from the four branches of the
military services. SIDLE PANEL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
The panel made eight recommendations, including the creation of media pools for early
press access to military operations and the development of security guidelines. SIDLE PANEL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 4-6. The eight recommendations were as follows:
1. "That public affairs planning for military operations be conducted concurrently with
operational planning."
2. That the largest practical press pools be employed during military operations to pro-
vide "the media with early access to an operation."
3. That the Secretary of Defense "study the matter of whether to use a pre-established
and constantly updated" list of accredited correspondents to be used when a pool of
correspondents is required for a particular military operation.
4. "That a basic tenet governing media access to military operations should be volun-
tary compliance by the media with security guidelines or ground rules established and
issued by the military."
5. That military planning include "sufficient equipment and qualified military personnel
whose function is to assist correspondents in covering [an] operation adequately."
6. That the military, "if necessary and feasible," dedicate communication facilities to
the media.
7. That the military provide for intra- and inter-theater transportation to support the
media.
8. That top military public affairs representatives meet with news organization leader-
ship on a regular basis to discuss mutual problems that might arise during media cover-
age of military operations.
Id. The Secretary of Defense approved and released these recommendations on August 23,
1984. News Release from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (Aug.
23, 1984) (No. 450-84).
56. Letter from retired Major General Wmant Sidle to General John W. Vessey, Jr. (un-




60. Olson, supra note 16, at 522.
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selection of reporters and the media had no control over the composi-
tion of the combat press pool.61 Some journalists flouted the panel's
recommendations, while other journalists believed "the Pentagon in-
tended to continue its recent policy of reviewing, on a case-by-case
basis, whether press access should be granted in future conflicts." 62
C. Post-Sidle Panel Conflicts: Panama and the Persian Gulf
On December 20, 1989, American forces invaded Panama in or-
der to topple Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega.63 The
invasion provided the first opportunity to implement the Sidle Panel's
recommendations.6 However, the military called the media-assigned
pool reporters "too late" to allow them "to cover the decisive U.S.
assaults in the... war."65 The heavy combat had ended by the time
the media pool arrived.66 A military review board commissioned after
the conflict concluded that "there was no effort to manipulate the
pool in Panama" but rather that the failure to implement it effectively
resulted from "good intentions gone awry, and unanticipated obsta-
cles."'67 Despite the military's efforts to facilitate press coverage of
combat operations, the problem of media access "was raised again
during the Persian Gulf War."'68
Before and during Operation Desert Storm, the Department of
Defense (DOD) issued regulations which restricted both press access
and its coverage of events.69 Two aspects of the press restrictions, the
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 522 n.107.
64. Olson, supra note 16, at 522.
65. DEPAR-mENT OF DEFENSE REVIEw OF PANAMA POOL DEPLOYMENT at 1 (Mar. 1990)
[hereinafter HOFFMAN REPORT].
66. Olson, supra note 16, at 522. "Consequently, pooled video footage of American
soldiers engaged in combat was rare; most material consisted of noncombat activities." Id.
67. HOFFMAN REPORT, supra note 65, at 1-3.
68. Olson, supra note 16, at 523.
69. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1563-64
(S.D.N.Y 1991).
The Central Command (CENTCOM) pool membership pools provided the following:
The following procedures pertain to the CENTCOM news media pool concept for pro-
viding news to the widest possible American audience during the initial stages of U.S.
military activities in the Arabian Gulf area .... There will be two types of pools:
eighteen-member pools for ground combat operations and smallerseven-member pools
for ground combat coverage and other coverage. Pools will be formed and governed by
the media organizations that are qualified to participate and will be administered
through pool appointed coordinators working in conjunction with the JIB [Joint Infor-
mation Bureau]-Dhahran. The media will operate under the ground rules issued by
CENTCOM on January 15,1991 .... Pool participants and media organizations eligible
to participate in the pools will share all media products within their medium; e.g., tele-
vision products will be shared by all other television pool members and photo products
9
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pool system and the security review, made the Persian Gulf regula-
tions the most strict in the history of press coverage of U.S. military
operations. 70  With the conclusion of the first week of the air war
will be shared with other photo pool members. The procedures for sharing those prod-
ucts and operating expenses of the pool will be determined by the partici- pants of each
medium. Recommendations for changes to pool membership or other procedures will
be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 1578-80.
The CENTCOM guidelines for the media provided the following:
For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:
(1) Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool
coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.
(2) In the event of hostilities, pool products will be [sic] subject to review before release
to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities,
operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the out-
come of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be ex-
amined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to
express criticism or cause embarrassment.The public affairs escort officer on scene will
review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited
circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed
materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for review by the
JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be
reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the
appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the
originating reporter's news organization.
Id. at 1577-78.
The Operation Desert Storm Ground Rules provided the following:
The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast
could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:
(1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, air-
craft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies..., including amounts of am-
munition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units ....
(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including
postponed or canceled operations.
(3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of
military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments
(4) Rules of engagement details.
(5) Information on intelligence collection activities ....
(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tacti-
cal deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives
(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land-based or car-
rier-based.
(8) Information on effectiveness or ineffectiveness of [the] enemy ....
(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft while search and
rescue operations are planned or underway.
(10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.
(11) Specific operating methods unique equipment or tactics ....
(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against
U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific
U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to
the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM ....
Id. at 1581-82.
70. David A. Frenznick, The First Amendment on the Battlefield: A Constitutional Analysis
of Press Access to Military Operations in Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf, 23 PAC. L.J.
10
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against Iraq, the press demanded that the regulations be lifted.7 The
Pentagon eventually responded by imposing a complete news black-
out immediately following the start of the ground offensive against
Iraqi forces on February 23, 1991.72 The blackout lasted until Febru-
ary 24, 1991, when Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney gave permission
for General Schwarzkopf to brief reporters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
on the early events of the offensive.73 When the military campaign
against Iraq concluded on March 4, 1991, the Pentagon lifted all press
restrictions in the Persian Gulf region.74
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTING PRESS ACCEss TO
MILITARY OPERATIONS
A. The Prior Restraint Doctrine
Under the constitutional doctrine of prior restraint, the govern-
ment may not restrain publishers and broadcasters from disseminating
315, 327 (1992). "Prior to the Persian Gulf War, correspondents had never been subject to both
escorted movement and censorship." Id. at 327 n.83.
71. Id. at 327. When the American bombardment of Iraq and Kuwait began on January 17,
1991, the military deployed pools to watch aircraft take off on and return from missions. Id. The
military also allowed the reporters to speak with returning pilots. Id. "However, military offi-
cials released very few details about the progress of the air war, and some censorship occurred."
Id.
When ground fighting began in late January 1991, reporters began to circumvent the organ-
ized pools. Id. at 328. By February 12, 1991, the military detained more than two dozen report-
ers for violating the pool regulations. Id.
72. Id. Although the Pentagon suspended regular briefings in Riyadh and Washington and
delayed dispatches from pool reporters, some journalists were able to provide accounts of the
ground war by travelling into the desert on their own in violation of the pool regulations. Id. at
328-29.
73. Id. at 329. Soon after the suspension of the blackout, "dispatches began to arrive from
pool reporters in the field." Id.
74. Frenznick, supra note 70, at 329. The Pentagon has placed few, if any, restrictions on
press access to military operations following the Persian Gulf War. Telephone Interview with
Clifford H. Bernath, Principal Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
(OATSD(PA)) (November 24,1994). In the Somalia peacekeeping operation from April 1992 to
March 1994, the DOD did not impose restrictions on the press. Id. In the October 1994
peacekeeping Operation in Haiti (which still continues), the DOD offered the press a few guide-
lines, some of which the press agreed to follow and others which it chose not to follow. Id. For
instance, the press agreed to avoid approaching soldiers during an operation and to refrain from
using lights that could adversely affect a soldier's night vision. Id. The DOD also advised the
press to stay off roofs, because in the event soldiers received fire from a roof, they would imme-
diately "take out" the roof and anyone on it regardless of their nationality. Id. Correspondents
covering the Haiti operation chose to disregard this guideline, and assured the DOD that they
would take care of themselves in the event that such a crisis arose. Id. In the October 1994
troop deployment to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, countering an Iraqi military threat to Kuwait's
northern border, the DOD arranged with the Saudi Embassy to obtain visas for all journalists -
as it did during the 1991 deployment to the Middle East. Id. Furthermore, the DOD did not
place restrictions on the press during the 1994 deployment. Id.
11
DelVechhio: Press Access to American Military Operations and the First Amendm
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1995
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
information unless certain extraordinary circumstances apply.75 In
Near v. Minnesota,76 the 'first case to discuss the constitutionality of
prior restraints on military-related information, a statute mandated
that one who "engaged in the business of regularly or customarily pro-
ducing [or] publishing ...a malicious, scandalous and defamatory
newspaper.., is guilty of a nuisance, and... may be enjoined. ' 77 A
county attorney brought an action under the statute to enjoin the pub-
lication of an article in a local newspaper which alleged that a Jewish
gangster controlled criminal activities in Minneapolis and that law en-
forcement officers were not energetically performing their duties to
bring about an end to his activities.78 The trial court declared that the
newspaper constituted a public nuisance and enjoined the defendants
from producing, editing or publishing any publication that was "mali-
cious, scandalous or defamatory" and from conducting a nuisance
under the title of the newspaper.79 The defendant, Near, appealed to
the state supreme court who affirmed the judgment upon the author-
ity of the lower court's decision." Near then appealed the decision to
the United States Supreme Court.8 ' The Supreme Court reversed the
decision and held that the statute was unconstitutional because it in-
fringed upon the liberty of the press guaranteed in the Constitution.
8
In dicta, Chief Justice Hughes recognized an exception for national
security:
When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not
be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard
them as protected by any constitutional right .... No one would
question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to
its recruiting service or the publication of sailing dates of transports
or the number and location of troops.83
75. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-17 (1931),
76. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
77. Id. at 702 (citing 1927 MuN. SEss. LAw 285 (Mason)).
78. Id. at 703-04. The complaint alleged that the defendant periodical, on nine separate
dates from September to November, 1927, published and circulated articles that were largely
malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. Id. at 703.
79. Id. at 706.
80. Id. at 706-07.
81. Near, 283 U.S. at 707.
82. Id. at 722-23.
83. Id. at 716 (dicta) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 31:227
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In New York Times Co. v. United States (the "Pentagon Papers"
case)' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the govern-
ment could enjoin the publication of classified military information
already obtained by the press.' The federal government sought to
enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing
the contents of a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-
Making Process on Viet Nam Policy. ' s6 In a brief per curiam opinion,
the Court stated the general rule that "[a]ny system of prior restraint
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity" and, therefore, the government
"carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of
such restraint."8 The Court held that the prior restraint was unconsti-
tutional since the government failed to meet its burden of proof.8"
In a concurring opinion, Justice Black, with whom Justice Doug-
las joined, wrote that "[o]nly a free and unrestrained press can effec-
tively expose deception in government. And paramount among the
responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the
government from deceiving the people...."8" Justice Black rejected
the government's argument that the newspapers should be enjoined in
the name of national security and concluded that the newspapers only
did that which the Founders intended when they disclosed the work-
ings of the government which gave rise to the Vietnam War.90
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, recognized that the
First Amendment ban on prior restraints can only be overridden when
the nation is at war.91 Justice Brennan concluded that, absent any
clear proof that the publication of the contents of the study could
cause great harm, any injunction on the publication of the article
would violate the First Amendment.92
The six concurring opinions in New York Times mandate that the
government has the burden of showing justification for imposing pre-
publication censorship on the press.93 However, when the govern-
ment denies the press access to military operations, it prevents the
84. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
85. Id. at 714.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
89. Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).
92. 403 U.S. at 727 (Brennan, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 714.
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press from gathering news rather than preventing the publication of
any information. 4 Generally, governmental actions that prevent pub-
lication of material that has already been obtained is the focus of any
prior restraint analysis.95 Consequently, the Court has been unwilling
to invoke the prior restraint doctrine in news gathering situations. 96
In Pell v. Procunier,97 three professional journalists and four
prison inmates brought an action in federal district court challenging
the constitutionality of a regulation in the California Department of
Corrections manual which provided that the press could not interview
specific individual inmates. 98 The district court, in granting the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss, held that the broad access afforded pris-
oners by the press' right to interview inmates at random sufficiently
protects the press' rights.99 The journalists appealed to the Supreme
Court.100 The Court held that newsmen have the same constitutional
right of access to prisons and their inmates as the general public and
no more.10 1 The Court concluded:
It is one thing to say.., that government cannot restrain the publi-
cation of news emanating from [certain] sources .... It is quite
another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon govern-
ment the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of
information not available to members of the public generally. That
proposition finds no support in the words of the Constitution or in
any decision of this Court.'0 2
94. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976) (holding that the First
Amendment "guarantees to afford special protection against orders that prohibit the publication
or broadcast of particular information or commentary orders that impose a 'previous' or 'prior'
restraint"); see also Cassell, supra note 8, at 950.
95. Cassell, supra note 8, at 950.
96. Id. Some scholars question the usefulness of prior restraint analysis. See generally, John
C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE LJ. 409, 434 (1983).
97. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
98. Id. at 819.
99. Id. at 821. The district court, in granting the inmates' motion for summary judgment,
held that the regulation prohibiting the inmates from being interviewed in person by journal-
ists,violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms. Id. The prison officials appealed
to the Supreme Court. Id. at 819. The Court reversed holding that in light of alternative chan-
nels of communication that are open to the inmates, the regulation does not constitute a viola-
tion of their rights of free speech. Id. at 835.
100. Id. at 821.
101. Id. at 834.
102. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974); see also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368, 385-86, 391 (1979) (holding no Sixth Amendment public right of access to a pretrial
judicial proceeding exists); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (upholding travel restrictions
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The Court also has blocked constitutional challenges, based on
the prior restraint doctrine, to prepublication security review agree-
ments.1 "3 In Snepp v. United States,1°4 Snepp, a former CIA Agent
who signed a lifetime prepublication agreement as a condition of his
employment with the CIA, was obligated not to disclose any classified
information relating to the Agency without proper authority. 10 5 The
Court upheld the agreement against First Amendment challenge,
mentioning in a footnote to the opinion that "[t]he Government has a
compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information im-
portant to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality
so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence ser-
vice."'1 6 The Court concluded that the prepublication agreement that
Snepp signed was a reasonable means for protecting the government's
interest in national security and the operation of our foreign intelli-
gence service.0 7
Unlike the agreement signed by Snepp, a prepublication agree-
ment signed by a military correspondent is not a condition of employ-
ment. 08 Moreover, the Court's rationale makes any distinction
between Snepp and a military correspondent irrelevant10 9 In Snepp
the Court found that when Snepp joined the CIA, he was "entering a
trust relationship."110 Likewise, "a correspondent who becomes ac-
credited and joins a military unit similarly enters a trust relationship
because he will be privy to sensitive information."' Thus, the consti-
tutional doctrine of prior restraint cannot serve as a basis for a chal-
lenge to military censorship." 2
The Supreme Court places a heavy burden on the government to
show justification for the imposition of prepublication restraint on in-
formation already obtained by the press.1 3 However, the Court has
103. Typically, "[c]orrespondents were not allowed in the theaters of war unless they were
accredited," and in order to get accreditation and access to front lines, a correspondent had to
"sign an agreement to submit all his copy to military or naval censorship." KNIrHTY, supra
note 31, at 275 (discussing accreditation during World War II). The Sidle Panel recommended
that reporters who violate security guidelines established by the Pentagon should be excluded
from further coverage of the operation. SIDLE PANEL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
104. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
105. Id. at 507-08.
106. Id. 't 509 n.3.
107. Id.
108. Cassell, supra note 8, at 951
109. Id.
110. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 510.
111. Cassell, supra note 8, at 951.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 75-94 and accompanying text.
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been reluctant to invoke the prior restraint doctrine where the gov-
ernment has denied the press access to gathering information. 114
Thus, the doctrine of prior restraint is not useful in considering
whether the Constitution requires press access to military
operations. 115
B. The Development of the Right of Access
In Branzburg v. Hayes,1 6 the Supreme Court recognized a "lim-
ited First Amendment right of access to information."'1 17 In
Branzburg, a newspaper reporter who wrote an article describing in
detail his observance of drug activity sought First Amendment protec-
tion to avoid disclosing the identity of his sources before a grand
jury." 8 The reporter claimed that his First Amendment right to
gather news required that on some occasions he "agree either not to
identify the source of information published or to publish only part of
the facts revealed." 9 He argued that forcing him to testify in front of
a grand jury would discourage confidential sources of other reporters
from coming forward in the future, thereby measurably deterring the
free flow of information that the First Amendment protects. 120
The Court in its holding declined to grant newsmen a testimonial
privilege under the First Amendment beyond that granted to ordinary
citizens.' 2' However, Justice White endorsed a limited First Amend-
ment right of access to information when he wrote: "We do not ques-
tion the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the country's
welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for
First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.' 122
A few years later, the media's aspiration of a complete First
Amendment right of access suffered a setback.2 3 In the companion
114. See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
115. Cassell, supra note 8, at 949.
116. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
117. Olson, supra note 16, at 523 (summarizing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681).
118. 408 U.S. at 670.
119. Id. at 679.
120. Id. at 679-80.
121. Id. at 690-91.
122. Id. at 681. Justice Stewart agreed: "A corollary of the right to publish must be the right
to gather news. The full flow of information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee
would be severely curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded to the process by which
news is assembled and disseminated." Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
123. Cassell, supra note 8, at 953.
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cases of Pell v. Procunier24 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 125 the
Court held that regulations which barred the press from conducting
face-to-face interviews with specific inmates did not violate the First
Amendment.'26 The Court "emphasize[d] the ability of the general
public to gain access as a guide to the appropriate level of access for
the press." 27 Furthermore, the Court refused to impose an affirma-
tive duty on the government to make special access for the press. 28
In Houchins v. KQED, Inc.'2 9 the Court considered the question
of whether limited press access to a dilapidated county jail violated
the First Amendment rights of the press.'30 Justice Stewart wrote the
crucial concurrence in a three-one-three split agreeing that there was
no special right of access: "The Constitution does no more than as-
sure the public and the press equal access once government has
opened its doors.' 131 However, Justice Stewart also concluded that
"terms of access that are reasonably imposed on individual members
of the public may, if they impede effective reporting without sufficient
justification, be unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there
to convey to the general public what the visitors see."1 32 The Court
emphasized the availability of other channels for the press to receive
information regarding the conditions in jails. 33 In any event, the out-
come of the case was unfavorable for a special right of press access to
government information. 34
The next year, in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,'35 a newspaper
owner challenged an order closing a pretrial suppression hearing. 36
The Supreme Court rejected the attack and declined to reach a deci-
sion on the First Amendment question. Instead, it held that the public
has no constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to attend a
124. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
125. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
126. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
127. Frank B. Cross & Stephen M. Griffin, A Right of Press Access to United States Military
Operations, 21 SuiioLc U. L. REv. 989, 1023 (1987).
128. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834.
129. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
130. Id. at 3-4.
131. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
132. Id. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 15-16.
134. Cross & Griffin, supra note 127, at 1024. The opinion held "[n]either the First Amend-
ment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to governmental information or
sources of information within the government's control." Houchins, 438 U.S. 1, 15.
135. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
136. Cassell, supra note 8, at 954.
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pretrial hearing.137 However, in light of the Court's decision in Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,'13 Gannett's precedential worth is
uncertain. 39 In Richmond Newspapers members of the press con-
tested a court order which closed a murder trial to the public.' 40 The
Court held that "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings,
the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.' 14 ' The Court
emphasized the historical openness of criminal trials as a significant
basis for its decision.' 42
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, announced: "This is a water-
shed case .... [Today] ... for the first time, the Court unequivocally
holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important informa-
tion is an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and of the press
protected by the First Amendment. 43 Justice Stewart concurred,
stating that "[iun conspicuous contrast to a military base,... a trial
courtroom is a public place." 44
However, confusion reigned following the decision of Richmond
Newspapers because the holding was a plurality opinion."45 Some
scholars viewed the decision in Richmond Newspapers as a prominent
step toward more extensive free press rights. 46 Other scholars argued
that the only right assured by the decision was the constitutional right
to attend a criminal trial.147 Chief Justice Burger favored a public
right of access to a criminal trial, however, he did not square his opin-
ion in Richmond Newspapers with his plurality opinion in Houchins
which was more hostile.148
Two years after Richmond Newspapers, the Court, in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,149 substantially extended the First
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings. 50 The Court
found that a Massachusetts statute excluding the press and public
from rape trials during the testimony of a minor victim violated the
137. 443 U.S. at 391.
138. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
139. Cassell, supra note 8, at 954.
140. 448 U.S. at 560.
141. Id. at 581 (plurality opinion).
142. Id. at 573.
143. Id. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
144. Richmond Newspaper, Inc., 448 U.S. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring).
145. Cross & Griffin, supra note 127, at 1026.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1027.
148. Id.
149. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
150. Cross & Griffin, supra note 127, at 1027.
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First Amendment. 5' A majority of the Court concluded that the First
Amendment guaranteed a right of access to criminal trials because
"the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general
public"'1 2 and because "the right of access to criminal trials plays a
particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process
and the government as a whole. ' 15 3 The public must be admitted to
criminal trials unless "the denial [of access] is necessitated by a com-
pelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest."'1 4 The Court invalidated Massachusetts' mandatory closure
statute because although the statute served a compelling governmen-
tal interest, it was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 5 5 The
Court concluded that a trial court should "determine on a case-by-
case basis whether the State's legitimate concern for the well-being of
the minor [rape] victim necessitates closure."'15 6
The Court's decisions in Richmond Newspapers and Globe News-
paper suggest a three-part test in determining whether the press has a
First Amendment right of access of government information:'57 (1)
the claimant must show that the area sought to be accessed has histor-
ically been open to the press and the general public; 58 (2) the right of
access must play a "particularly significant role in the functioning of
the process in question and the government as a whole;"'159 and (3) if
the first two tests are met, the government may only deny access if it
establishes "that the denial is necessitated by a compelling govern-
mental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.' 60
This test suggests in theory that the press may have a First Amend-
ment right of access to the battlefield, but the Court has never af-
forded the press such a right. The issue of a First Amendment right of
press access has been raised in the lower federal courts on two sepa-
rate occasions.' 6'
151. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607-11.
152. Id. at 605.
153. Globe, 457 U.S. at 606.
154. Id. at 607.
155. Id. at 609.
156. Id.
157. See Frenznick, supra note 70, at 348.
158. Globe, 457 U.S. at 605.
159. Id. at 606.
160. Id. at 606-07.
161. See Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam), affg the judgment
but vacating the opinion of 588 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1984); Nation Magazine v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
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C. Applying Press Access Rights to Military Operations
In Flynt v. Weinberger,162 the publisher of Hustler magazine,
Larry Flynt, filed suit against then Secretary of Defense Caspar Wein-
berger and others, alleging that the military violated the First Amend-
ment rights of the press by banning them from covering the 1983
American invasion of Grenada. 63 Flynt challenged the decision of
the American government to prohibit press coverage of the initial
stages of the military operation in Grenada seeking injunctive and de-
claratory relief.164 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the case was moot and therefore no longer justiciable.165 In
its holding, the court noted that the military granted Hustler limited
access to Grenada, by military transport, on October 27, 1983, and
unlimited access by November 7, 1983.166 Because Flynt sought "de-
claratory judgment solely with respect to the constitutionality of the
press ban in Grenada," the court found no live controversy at the time
of review.167
Six years later, in Nation Magazine v. United States Department of
Defense,68 several press organizations filed an action against the De-
partment of Defense challenging the constitutionality of DOD press
restrictions issued during the Persian Gulf War. 169  The plaintiffs
claimed that "the press [had] a First Amendment right to unlimited
access to foreign arenas in which American military forces are en-
gaged.' 170  The plahntiffs further asserted that "the DOD 'pooling
regulations,' which limit access to the battlefield to a specified number
162. 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
163. Flynt, 762 F.2d at 134-35.
164. Id. The complaint alleged that "the defendants ... in preventing ... or otherwise
hindering Plaintiffs' efforts to send reporters to the sovereign nation of Grenada for the purpose
of gathering news is in violation of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States." Id.
at 135. The complaint also requested that "the Defendants... be restrained and enjoined from
preventing or otherwise hindering Plaintiffs from sending reporters to the sovereign nation of
Grenada to gather news and [be] direct[ed] ... to take such steps as may be necessary... for the
purpose of gathering and transmitting the news." Id.
165. Id. at 136.
166. Id. at 135.
167. Id. By the time the court heard the arguments in the case, the military concluded its
operation in Grenada and lifted all press restrictions. Id.
168. 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
169. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1560-61. See note 69 supra for the Persian Gulf press
restrictions.
170. Id. at 1561.
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of press representatives and subject them to certain restrictions, in-
fringe[d] on news gathering privileges accorded by the First Amend-
ment."171 The DOD argued that "the First Amendment [did] not bar
the government from restricting access to combat activities and that
the regulations [were] narrowly tailored and necessitated by compel-
ling national security concerns.' 72
By the time the court heard oral arguments on February 14, 1991,
the military lifted all press restrictions. 73 The defendants moved to
dismiss the case expounding three arguments: (1) the plaintiffs lacked
standing since they had not shown that they were excluded from ad-
mission to any media pool; 74 (2) the controversy presented a political
question; 75 and (3) the issue became moot once the regulations were
suspended. 76 The court, however, found that the harms alleged by
the plaintiffs were "distinct and palpable" and concluded that the
plaintiffs had standing to raise First and Fifth Amendment claims. 77
The court also found that "the case [could not] be held non-justiciable
on political question grounds."'7" The most difficult question for the
court was whether the case would survive a mootness challenge.179
Under the doctrine of mootness, a case becomes moot "when the
issues presented are no longer live" at the time of review.' How-
ever, as with most doctrines, exceptions to the mootness doctrine ex-
ist. The exception applicable in Nation Magazine was that an issue is
not moot if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." " ' The
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1560. Press restrictions were lifted on March 4, 1991.
Id.
174. Id. at 1561. A person has standing to bring a claim in a federal court if he can show (1)
an injury in fact, (2) traceable to the defendant's challenged conduct, that is (3) redressable by a
favorable court decision. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
175. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1561.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1566. At first, none of the plaintiffs had been excluded from a media pool, how-
ever, the consolidation of the case with Agence-France Presse resolved this dispute since they
had actually been excluded. Id.
178. Id. at 1566-67. The political question doctrine incorporates three inquiries: "(i) Does
the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordi-
nate branch of government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move
beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial
intervention?" Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979).
179. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1568.
180. Id. (citing Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982)).
181. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515
(1911).
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court found that this exception applied and heard opposing arguments
in the case.182 The court concluded:
The war in the Persian Gulf... was short and swift. Even with
efforts by all parties, the judicial process often will not be able to
resolve legal controversies such as this before hostilities have
ceased.... As such, this Court concludes that the controversy en-
gendered by the CENTCOM regulations did not "last long enough
for complete judicial review."... Because of the speed with which
wars have terminated, as is clearly documented by the sequence of
events in Qanama and Grenada, the evading review test ...is
satisfied. 183
However, by the time the court heard arguments the military had
lifted all press restrictions.184 The court noted that injunctive relief is
an inappropriate remedy for past injuries, and since there was no
longer "any presently existing operative practice" for the court to en-
join, the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed as moot.8 5 Furthermore, in
dicta, the court recognized that "[c]ivilian courts should hesitate long
before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the...
necessarily unique structure of the [m]ilitary [e]stablishment.' 8 6
The lower federal courts, in Flynt and Nation Magazine, avoided
constitutional issues by finding that the claims of the plaintiffs were
moot.' s However, future conflicts involving American forces poten-
tially can give rise to similar press restrictions and resultant First
Amendment claims. 88 If a claim by the press were to survive a moot-
ness challenge, the Supreme Court may resolve the dispute by apply-
ing the tests outlined in Richmond Newspapers and Globe
182. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1569. In Flynt v. Weinberger, however, the court
found that the case "did not fall within the mootness doctrine for those controversies 'capable of
repetition, yet evading review' exception because there was no 'reasonable expectation' that the
controversy in Grenada would recur." 762 F.2d at 135 (citing Welnstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S.
147, 149 (1975)).
183. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1569 (citations omitted).
184. Id. at 1575.
185. Id. at 1570.
186. Id. at 1566-67 (citations omitted).
187. Flynt, 762 F.2d at 136; Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1575.
188. Olson, supra note 16, at 528; see also Department of Defense Directive No. 5122.5 at 1,
2-1, 3-1 (Dec. 2, 1993) (providing authorization to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) to "[e]nsure a free flow of news and information to the media, the
general public, the internal audiences of the Armed Forces, and other appropriate forums, lim-




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss1/7
1995] PRESS ACCESS TO AMERICAN MILITARY OPERATIONS 249
Newspaper.8 9 A right of access may exist if two conditions are satis-
fied: (1) a showing that the area sought to be accessed has been histor-
ically open to the press and the general public and (2) a showing that
the right of access plays a significant role in the process of government
as a whole.190
Throughout history the U.S. government has not held its military
operations open to the public.191 Access to military operations usually
is limited to accredited members of the press, and in comlando-type
raids neither the press nor the public has been given access.192 "Fur-
thermore, media access to military operations arguably fails to play a
significant role in the functioning of our government and its ability to
wage war." '193 "The ability of the media to independently report on
the conduct of a war does not contribute significantly to the govern-
ment's ability to wage war.'1 9 4 Operational security and the element
of surprise are essential to conducting successful warfare and thus re-
quire a controlled press. 195
The decision in Globe Newspaper may require that press access
restrictions be narrowly tailored to serve compelling government in-
terests.196 A DOD directive issued on December 2, 1993, provides for
limited pooling arrangements "even under conditions of open [press]
coverage."' 97 Given the lethal circumstance of war and the need for
heightened security, the current DOD regulations meet the condition
of being narrowly tailored. A reporter with unlimited access to Amer-
ican military plans and strategies poses a direct and serious threat to
the safety of American forces if that reporter improvidently leaks such
information. 19 The pooling arrangements provide a narrowly tailored
"check" on such a threat.
189. See discussion supra section IV.B.
190. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
191. See Olson, supra note 16, at 528.
192. Id. at 528-29.
193. See Olson, supra note 16, at 529.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982).
197. Department of Defense Directive No. 5122.5 at 3-1 (Dec. 2, 1993) [hereinafter DOD
DmncrnvE]. The directive's "Statement of DOD Principles for News Media Coverage of DOD
Operations" provides, in pertinent part, that "[o]pen and independent reporting will be the prin-
ciple means of coverage of U.S. military operations," however, "[e]ven under conditions of open
coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote loca-
tions or where space is limited." Id. at 3-1. The directive also provides that "[flournalists in a
combat zone will be credentialed... and will ... abide by a clear set of military security ground
rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations." Id.
198. See supra note 1.
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The directive also establishes a security review of information ob-
tained by pool reporters.199 Although the Court noted in New York
Times that "any system of prior restraint of expression... bear[s] a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,"2 00 the Court in
its decision in Near supported the government's right to censor infor-
mation in time of war.2 0' In this age of satellite communications, in-
formation transmitted to the United States can easily be intercepted
by foreign countries.2 °2 Security review of material obtained by the
press in time of war ensures that the enemy does not receive informa-
tion it could use against American forces during war.203
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout American history, the government has restricted
press coverage of its military operations. At no time have restrictions
been more crucial than now due to the ability of the press to dissemi-
nate information globally and the concomitant ability of anyone to
receive it.
The latest DOD regulations establish a reasonable and narrowly
tailored means by which the American military can maintain opera-
tional security and the ensure the greatest possible degree of safety to
those who serve. The current regulations reconcile the interest of the
press in keeping the public informed about the American govern-
ment's military operations and the interests of the military in con-
ducting effective operations with minimal or no casualties. Thus, the
latest DOD pooling regulations and security reviews are constitu-
tional and should be implemented during future military operations.
Brian William DelVecchio
199. See DOD DmEcrxvE, supra note 186, at 2-1. The directive's "Principles of Informa-
tion" provide, in pertinent part, that "[i]nformation will be withheld only when disclosure would
adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the
Armed Forces." Id.
200. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
201. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
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